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Article

Everything’s at Stake: Preserving Authority to
Prevent Gun Violence in the Second
Amendment’s Third Chapter
Jonathan E. Lowy, Christa Nicols, & Kelly Sampson†
There is a scene in the Coen Brothers’ film, “No Country for Old
Men,” in which a menacing customer (played by Javier Bardem) asks
a store clerk to pick heads or tails of a coin. The clerk asks what he has
to win or lose from the toss.1 “Everything,” Bardem tells him.2 The
clerk does not know what the audience does: that Bardem has a
loaded gun and will, if the clerk guesses wrong, shoot him dead.
As courts consider whether the Second Amendment should restrict authority to enact and enforce strong gun laws, we are all that
clerk—except we know the consequences. More than 100,000 Americans are shot each year and nearly 40,000 killed; meanwhile, mass
shootings terrorize people everywhere from churches to movie theaters to elementary schools to street corners.3 As Americans are demanding solutions to this gun violence epidemic, courts are contemplating a sweeping construction of the Second Amendment that could
place those solutions at risk; everything is at stake.
These legal coin tosses will become riskier as we potentially enter
a third chapter of Second Amendment litigation. During the first
† The authors are, respectively, Vice President, Legal; Litigation and Constitutional Counsel; and Senior Counsel and Director of Racial Justice at Brady United
Against Gun Violence. Thanks to Joseph Blocher for his review, and Jennifer Kim, Mei
Li Bartholome, Kendall Bryant, Mihir Sardesai, Kayla Stadeker, Sarah Lim, and Naomi
Jaffe for their research. Copyright © 2021 by Jonathan E. Lowy. Copyright © 2021 by
Christa Nicols. Copyright © 2021 by Kelly Sampson.
1. NO COUNTRY FOR OLD MEN (Scott Rudin Prods. 2007).
2. Id.
3. Key
Statistics,
BRADY,
https://www.bradyunited.org/key-statistics
[https://perma.cc/PDZ4-7ZR7]; John Gramlich, What the Data Says About Gun Deaths
in the United States, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/16/what-the-data-says-about-gun-deaths-inthe-u-s [https://perma.cc/66XZ-TLSH].
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chapter (1789–2008), the idea “that the Second Amendment poses no
barrier to strong gun laws,” as former Solicitor General and Harvard
Law School Dean Erwin Griswold said, was “perhaps the most wellsettled proposition in American constitutional law.”4 The second
chapter (2008–2021) began with District of Columbia v. Heller, in
which the Supreme Court jettisoned the “well-regulated militia,” instead construing the Second Amendment as protecting private gun
rights, thus empowering courts to strike down gun laws.5 But, with
few exceptions, most courts in the second chapter have not expanded
on Heller’s right of “law-abiding, responsible citizens” to have a gun in
the home for self-defense.6 They have followed Part III of Justice
Scalia’s Heller opinion, which explained that the Second Amendment
is “not unlimited,” and allows for many gun laws.7
Gun rights advocates are hoping for a third chapter, in which
courts will vastly expand the scope of private gun rights. They hope
the Supreme Court launches this new era in New York State Rifle and
Pistol Association (“NYSRPA”) v. Bruen.8
In Bruen, the Court will decide to what extent New York (or any
state) can restrict carrying concealed handguns in public.9 “Gun
rights” advocates seek to establish a sweeping interpretation of the
Second Amendment, unprecedented in American law, that could entitle virtually anyone to carry loaded guns virtually anywhere, to fire
when they see fit, and deprive states of the authority to stop them before it is too late.10 The Court could also adopt a standard of review
that could empower judges to strike down virtually any gun law. This
would put the United States into uncharted waters, because Americans have always decided gun policy through democratic processes,
not judges.
4. Erwin N. Griswold, Phantom Second Amendment ‘Rights’, WASH. POST (Nov. 4,
1990), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1990/11/04/phantom
-second-amendment-rights/f4381818-fed9-4e63-8d62-f62056818181
[https://
perma.cc/EZM7-YDQZ].
5. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 621–22 (2008) (stating that the
Court upheld challenged provisions of the National Firearms Act in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) because the type of weapon at issue was dangerous and unusual, not because the Second Amendment failed to protect a right unconnected to militia service).
6. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
7. Id. at 626.
8. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Beach, 818 Fed.App’x 99 (2d Cir. 2020), appeal
docketed sub nom., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (U.S. Dec. 23,
2020).
9. Id.
10. See id.
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The efficacy of gun laws indicates the life and death consequences
of these decisions. Comprehensive gun regulation11 has led other comparable countries to reach a gun violence rate that is twenty-five times
lower than the United States’ rate.12 It is now more likely that an
American will be killed by a gun than a car crash, whereas in Japan, for
example, a resident is as likely to die from gunfire as a lightning
strike.13
States with strong gun laws generally experience lower gun violence rates than states with weak laws. In 1993, California had the sixteenth highest gun death rate in the country; but by 2017, after enacting strong gun laws, it had the seventh lowest rate.14 Conversely, the
2007 repeal of Missouri’s background check laws was associated with
a 14% increase in the overall murder rate, and a 25% increase in firearm homicide specifically.15 Gun laws work. The proof is in the data.
A 2019 RAND study associated state laws that permissively allow
public gun carrying and stand your ground laws (which relax standards for gun use in self-defense) with a 3% increase in firearm homicide rates.16 On the other side, a study found that handgun waiting periods reduce firearm homicides by 17%,17 while handgun purchaser

11. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1999).
12. Erin Grinshteyn & David Hemenway, Violent Death Rates: The US Compared
with Other High-Income OECD Countries, 2010, 129 AM. J. MED 266, 268–72 (2015).
13. See Kevin Quealy & Margot Sanger-Katz, In Other Countries, You’re as Likely to
Be Killed by a Falling Object as by a Gun, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www
.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/upshot/in-other-countries-youre-as-likely-to-be-killed
-by-a-falling-object-as-a-gun.html [https://perma.cc/5US5-EYDX].
14. Memorandum from Giffords Law Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence to Interested
Parties (Nov. 22, 2019), https://giffords.org/press-release/2019/11/memo
-california-gun-laws [https://perma.cc/K5RL-XDT9] (citing data compiled by the CDC
and publicly available through WISQARS at https://webappa.cdc.gov/
sasweb/ncipc/mortrate.html). See also Bindu Kalesan et al., Firearm Legislation and
Firearm Mortality in the USA: A Cross-Sectional, State-Level Study, 387 LANCET 1847,
1853 (2016); Alex Yablon, What We Know About the Effectiveness of Universal Gun
Background
Checks,
THE
TRACE
(Jan.
10,
2019),
https://www
.thetrace.org/2019/01/universal-background-checks-reduce-gun-violence-research
[https://perma.cc/HU5V-W776].
15. Daniel Webster, Cassandra Kercher Crifasi, & Jon S. Vernick, Effects of the Repeal of Missouri’s Handgun Purchaser Licensing Law on Homicides, 91 J. URB. HEALTH
293, 293–302 (2014).
16. Terry L. Schell et al., Changes in Firearm Mortality Following the Implementation of State Law Regulating Firearm Access and Use, 117 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.
14906, 14907 (2020).
17. Michael Luca, et al., Handgun Waiting Periods Reduce Gun Deaths, 114 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 12162, 12162 (2017).
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licensing laws were linked to a 14% decrease in firearm homicides in
urban counties.18
There is good reason for concern that the Court in Bruen could
place these and other demonstrably effective policy measures at risk.
Now, three Trump nominees join with three Justices from the 5–4 majority in Heller.19 Do the math.
But the gun lobby should not start shooting off their celebratory
gunfire just yet. Heller, and the historical traditions on which it relies,
support upholding New York’s law, and other longstanding gun laws.
And Heller, intentionally or not, tracked what many Americans believe—that they have some right to firearms, but restrictions are generally allowed.20 Indeed, more sweeping conceptions of the Second
Amendment are at odds with most Americans’ views.21 Limiting Heller
to its narrow holding might therefore hit the political sweet spot.
This Article argues that preserving Americans’ authority to enact
strong gun laws is consistent with Heller and longstanding tradition.
And Heller’s historical and doctrinal shortcomings make it far too
shaky a foundation to expand upon.
I. THE ISSUES POSED IN BRUEN
NYSRPA v. Bruen involves a challenge to New York’s concealed
handgun carry licensing scheme, which has been in place since 1913.22
New York law generally requires anyone who wishes to possess a
handgun to obtain a license from local authorities.23 The state does not
issue licenses to openly carry handguns. The state only licenses individuals to carry firearms in public who have “proper cause,” which
18. Cassandra K. Crifasi et al., Association Between Firearm Laws and Homicide in
Urban Counties, 95 J. URB. HEALTH 383, 383–90 (2018).
19. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
20. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Believes Americans Have a Right to Own Guns,
GALLUP (Mar. 27, 2008), https://news.gallup.com/poll/105721/public-believes
-americans-right-own-guns.aspx [https://perma.cc/64CN-GU5L].
21. See, e.g., Eli Yokley, Voters Are Nearly United in Support of Expanded Background
Checks,
MORNING
CONSULT
(Mar.
10,
2021),
https://
morningconsult.com/2021/03/10/house-gun-legislation-background-checks-polling
[https://perma.cc/5T3E-HUXY] (finding that 84% of voters support universal background checks); Americans Favor Stricter Gun Laws, Though Support Has Declined from
2019, IPSOS (Mar. 24, 2021), https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/americans-favor-stricter
-gun-laws-though-support-has-declined-from-2019 (last visited Nov. 1, 2021) (noting
that 65% of Americans believe gun laws should be stricter).
22. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Beach, 818 Fed.App’x 99 (2d Cir. 2020), appeal
docketed sub nom., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (U.S. Dec. 23,
2020).
23. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00 (McKinney 2021).
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includes target practice, hunting, or a “special need for self-protection
that is distinguishable from the general community or of persons engaged in the same profession.”24 The Petitioners in Bruen claim that
New York’s licensing law infringes on their Second Amendment rights
by not issuing concealed-carry licenses for generalized self-defense
purposes.25
The Second Circuit upheld New York’s law, relying on a similar
2012 ruling that held that, under Heller, the law was a “presumptively
lawful” longstanding regulation that does not implicate the Second
Amendment.26 The court also found the law constitutional under intermediate scrutiny, because the restriction does not implicate the
core right to self-defense in the home and is substantially related to an
important government interest.27
The Bruen Petitioners asked the Supreme Court to establish the
right to use a firearm in self-defense outside the home; but the Court
narrowed the question presented to “[w]hether the state of New
York’s denial of petitioners’ applications for concealed-carry licenses
for self-defense violated the Second Amendment.”28 Regardless, a ruling by the Court could address, either in its holding or persuasive
dicta, broader issues regarding state authority to regulate carrying
guns in public, and what standard of review should govern Second
Amendment challenges.
II. HELLER AND HISTORY “FROM TIME IMMEMORIAL”
It is unquestionable that some Justices have an appetite to vastly
limit governmental authority to enact gun laws. In dissents before
nomination to the Court, Justice Kavanaugh opined that the Constitution entitles civilians to possess military-style assault weapons;29 Justice Barrett claimed that the government could not deprive individuals convicted of certain felons from owning guns.30 Justices Thomas

24. Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d. 81, 86 (2d. Cir. 2012), cert. denied
sub nom., Kachalsky v. Cacace, 569 U.S. 918 (2013).
25. Brief for Petitioners at 2, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, No. 20-843
(U.S. Dec. 23, 2020), 2021 WL 3017303, at *1.
26. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 100.
27. Id. at 96.
28. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 25, at i.
29. Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
30. Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 451 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting).
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and Gorsuch have complained that some courts treat the Second
Amendment as a “second class” right.31
On the other hand, the Justices may not be willing to take the unprecedented leap that would deprive Americans of the authority to
protect public spaces from gun violence and give judges broad veto
power over life-saving gun laws. Such a decision could damage not just
Americans’ safety, but the Court’s institutional credibility. Indeed, Heller was a controversial decision, sharply criticized by many as inconsistent with the Framers’ text, purpose, and history. A ruling that restricts governmental authority to keep hidden handguns out of public
places would run counter to over a century of Supreme Court precedent.
Heller’s holding was narrow—the majority found “that the District’s ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second
Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearms in the home operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.”32 “And whatever else it leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”33
While “gun rights” advocates argue that Heller implies a right to
use guns wherever one deems they are needed for self-defense,34 the
Court appeared to reject this argument. In section three of the majority opinion, the Heller Court went out of its way to explain that its ruling did not deprive governments of their authority to address gun violence.35 Section three announced that the Second Amendment is “not
unlimited,” and is consistent with strong gun laws.36 As such, the Court
noted that the government may restrict who can possess guns, where
guns can be brought, how guns are sold, and what guns can be sold.37
In apparent response to the brief submitted by the United States (represented by then-Solicitor General, now NYSRPA and NRA-counsel
Paul Clement), which sought protection of existing federal gun laws,

31. See Friedman v. Highland Park, 577 U.S. 1039, 1039 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1996 (2017) (Thomas, J. and Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
32. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (emphasis added).
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. See, e.g., id. at 599, 630.
35. Id. at 626–28.
36. Id. at 626.
37. Id. at 626–27.
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the Court included a non-exhaustive list of gun laws that remain “presumptively lawful.”38
The Court also was explicit that the Second Amendment did not
include a right to carry concealed guns in public. The Court recognized
that “[f]rom Blackstone through the 19th century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to
keep and carry any weapon whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”39
Heller noted approvingly that “the majority of the 19th century courts
to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed
weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.”40
This limitation accorded with the century-old Supreme Court
precedent on which Heller relied. The Court’s 1897 Robertson v. Baldwin decision stated that “the right of the people to keep and bear arms
(art. 2) is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed
weapons . . . .”41 Robertson explained that the Bill of Rights
were not intended to lay down any novel principles of government, but
simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which we had inherited
from our English ancestors, and which had from time immemorial been subject to certain well-recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the
case. In incorporating these principles into the fundamental law there was
no intention of disregarding the exceptions, which continued to be recognized as if they had been formally expressed.42

Heller cited Robertson for this very proposition.43 Hence, the Second Amendment effectively “formally express[es]” that it does not
protect a right to carry concealed weapons. While “gun rights” advocates suggest that Heller’s reference to a right to use arms in “confrontation” supports a broad right to carry guns, that language is followed
by reference to the “pre-existing right” to arms, which excludes a right
to carry concealed weapons.
Heller also cited the 1872 Texas Supreme Court’s English v. State
decision which upheld a law largely prohibiting the carrying of pistols
and other concealable weapons.44 English found arguments that civilians were entitled to bring handguns into places “where ladies and
gentlemen are congregated together” “little short of ridiculous.”45
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 629 (emphasis added).
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1897).
Id. at 281.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 559–600.
Id. at 627.
English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 478–79 (1872).
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Strongly rejecting the premise that a civil society should entitle armed
civilians to use guns to respond to crime, English noted that people
should accept that,
in the great social compact under and by which states and communities are
bound and held together, each individual has compromised the right to
avenge his own wrongs, and must look to the state for redress. We must not
go back to that state of barbarism in which each claims the right to administer the law in his own case; that law being simply the domination of the
strong and the violent over the weak and submissive.46

English quoted John Stuart Mill’s recognition of “[t]he right inherent in society to ward off crimes against itself by antecedent precautions” as justification for keeping guns out of public spaces.47
Longstanding principles give the state far broader authority to
protect safety in public spaces than in private homes. As Professor
Darrell Miller notes, some constitutional rights are at their apex in, or
confined to, the home.48 Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson IV explained: “It is
not far-fetched to think that the Heller Court wished to leave open the
possibility that such a danger would rise exponentially as one moved
the [Second Amendment] right from the home to the public square.”49
The Court is, of course, free to embrace a more sweeping conception of the Second Amendment in Bruen and subsequent cases. However, if it does, it will reject limits accepted by the Heller majority, as
well as century-old Supreme Court precedent, which relied on traditions accepted “from time immemorial.”50
III. THE TRADITION OF GUN REGULATION IN AMERICA
A sweeping Second Amendment decision would run counter to
America’s historic tradition of gun regulation, which courts have recognized as wholly compatible with the Second Amendment.
The very same English gun rights that Heller claimed the Second
Amendment rests upon, allowed for strong gun laws, including prohibitions on public gun carrying.51 The English Bill of Rights of 1689 recognized that the right to own firearms “was vested not in individuals
but in Parliament, which remained free to determine ‘by law’ which
46. Id. at 477.
47. Id.
48. Darrell A. H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1303–10 (2009); see also Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller
Protect a Right to Carry Guns Outside the Home?, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 226 (2008).
49. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475–76 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
50. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1897).
51. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
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Protestant subjects could own which weapons and how they could be
used.”52 The 1328 Statute of Northampton was enacted to prevent individuals going or riding armed.53 A 1285 law greatly restricted carrying arms in London; a 1299 decree from King Edward generally
barred “going armed within the realm without the King’s special license.”54
Following this tradition, many cities in colonial America restricted gun firing55 and gunpowder storage and transportation,56 and
several early American laws prohibited the public carrying of firearms.57 “[C]olonial and early state governments routinely exercised
their police powers to restrict the time, place, and manner in which
Americans used their guns.”58
Numerous states during Reconstruction restricted—or prohibited—most public gun carrying.59 For example, Tennessee outlawed
any carrying of any pistol “except the army or navy pistol” and Wyoming barred anyone from “bear[ing] upon his person, concealed or
openly, any fire-arm or other deadly weapon, within the limits of any
city, town or village.”60 Courts repeatedly upheld these regulations
against constitutional challenges.61 The Heller-cited English opinion

52. Brief of Amici Curiae Jack N. Rakove, Saul Cornell, David T. Konig, William J.
Novak, Lois G. Schwoerer et al. in Support of Petitioners at 2, District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 157183, at *2.
53. Brief of Amicus Curiae Everytown for Gun Safety in Support of Appellants and
Reversal at 4, Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 157057), 2015 WL 5169122, at *4.
54. Mark Anthony Frassetto, Firearms and Weapons Legislation up to the Early
20th Century (Jan. 15, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2200991 [https://perma.cc/M69J-4L8F].
55. See, e.g., Patrick J. Charles, Scribble Scrabble, The Second Amendment, and Historical Guideposts: A Short Reply to Lawrence Rosenthal and Joyce Lee Malcolm, 105 NW.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 227, 241 n.98 (2011); Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep Arms in Early America: The Legal Context of the Second
Amendment, 25 L. & HIST. REV. 139, 163 (2007).
56. Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American
Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 505 n.119 (2004).
57. Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home: History Versus Ahistorical Standards of Review, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 36–41 (2012).
58. Churchill, supra note 55, at 162.
59. Brief of Thirty-Four Professional Historians and Legal Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9, McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No.
08-1521), 2010 WL 59025, at *9.
60. Id. at 17.
61. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 171 (1871); Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455,
461 (1876).
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relied on the Statute of Northampton as precedent for upholding
Texas’s broad ban on gun carrying.62
These courts recognized that a broad right to carry and use guns
in public is incompatible with a civil society. Similar to English, the Supreme Court of Georgia, in 1874, explained that expansive gun rights
are inconsistent with the Framers’ vision of “a well ordered and civilized community”:
To suppose that the framers of the constitution ever dreamed, that in their
anxiety to secure to the state a well-regulated militia, they were sacrificing
the dignity of their courts of justice, the sanctity of their houses of worship,
and the peacefulness and good order of their other necessary public assemblies, is absurd. To do so, is to assume that they took it for granted that their
whole scheme of law and order, and government and protection, would be a
failure, and that the people, instead [of] depending upon the laws and the
public authorities for protection, were each man to take care of himself, and
to be always ready to resist to the death, then and there, all opposers.63

To be sure, there were instances in which courts embraced a right
to carry guns in public, but, as Professors Saul Cornell and Eric Ruben
have explained, these anomalous cases generally arose from Southern
states seeking to sanction armed suppression of enslaved people.64
For example, the Bruen Petitioners claim the antebellum Bliss v. Commonwealth is “particularly instructive, given its proximity to the
founding.”65 Bliss struck down a ban on concealed carry as inconsistent with Kentucky’s analogue to the Second Amendment, which it
“assumed [] codified a preexisting right” to carry weapons in public
for self-defense.66 But Bliss is contrary to Robertson’s recognition that
the “preexisting right” did not include concealed carry, and Bliss was
overruled by an amendment to the state constitution.67 The Bruen Petitioners point to other cases from the antebellum South, including
Nunn v. State.68 But Nunn was rejected by the same court twenty-eight
62. English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1872).
63. Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 473, 478 (1874); see also Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry
Firearms Outside of the Home: Separating Historical Myths from Historical Realities, 39
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1718 (2016).
64. See Eric M. Ruben & Saul Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry, 125
YALE L.J. 121, 124–28 (2015); Saul Cornell & Eric M. Ruben, The Slave-State Origins of
Modern Gun Rights, ATLANTIC (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2015/09/the-origins-of-public-carry-jurisprudence-in-the-slave
-south/407809/ [https://perma.cc/N44N-VZTV].
65. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 20, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Corlett,
No. 20-843, 2021 WL 1602643 (Apr. 26, 2021), 2020 WL 7647665, at *20.
66. Id.
67. See Cornell, supra note 63, at 1715 n.116 (citing KY. CONST. of 1850 art. XIII, §
25).
68. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 65, at 21.
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years later, when Georgia’s Supreme Court was “at a loss to follow the
line of thought that extends the guarantee to the right to carry pistols,
disk, Bowie-knives, and those other weapons of like character, which,
as all admit, are the greatest nuisances of our day.”69 Moreover, these
outlier cases reflect practices adopted in slaveholding in the South, but
historian Saul Cornell explains: “Outside of the South, a robust model
of weapons regulations emerged and gained widespread acceptance
. . . [including] [p]rohibitions on concealed carry . . . .”70
The tradition of strong gun regulation is in keeping with the
founding vision of American government as focused on the public
good and public safety. The Declaration of Independence set out the
grounding principles for the new United States: life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness.71 James Madison explained to Congress that
“government is instituted and ought to be exercised for the benefit of
the people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with
the right of . . . pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”72
Thomas Jefferson reiterated that “the care of human life & happiness
& not their destruction, is the first and only legitimate object of good
government.”73
The Framers’ conception of public safety was forged from the Anglo-American tradition of bounding rights within the “public good,”74
which accepted that the greater population’s right to safety was
greater than individuals’ liberty to carry out dangerous activities. The
concept of “public good,” as defined by Blackstone, allows the legislature to require individuals to regulate certain rights when the public’s
benefit is substantial enough to justify it.75

69. Cornell, supra note 63, at 1718 (citing Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 473, 474 (1874)).
70. Id. at 1718–19.
71. See Letter from John Hancock, President of Congress, to the New York Convention (July 6, 1776), in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 33 (Peter Force ed., Ser. No. 5, 1846).
72. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
73. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to the Republicans of Washington County, Maryland
(Mar. 31, 1809), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-01-02-0088
[https://perma.cc/FM5P-MT8U].
74. See, e.g., JOHN ADAMS, 1 A DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1794); see also Samuel Adams, Mass. Lieutenant-Governor,
Speech to the Massachusetts House of Representatives and Senate (Jan. 17, 1794), in
RESOLVES OF THE GENERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 33, 34
(1794); Patrick J. Charles, Restoring “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” in Our
Constitutional Jurisprudence: An Exercise in Legal History, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
457, 477–523 (2011).
75. See Charles, supra note 57, at 48–49.
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From the Framers to today, Americans have never viewed the
Second Amendment as a suicide pact, a homicide pact, or a recipe for
insurrection. Individuals carrying weapons have not been seen as a
method for enforcing public safety, but rather as a disturbance to it.
IV. THE DANGERS POSED BY ENSHRINING A BROAD RIGHT TO
CARRY GUNS IN PUBLIC
Courts should account for the real toll that guns inflict on Americans every day: dangers that wholly differ from the historical antecedents which some contend should limit current gun policy. While the
Framers recognized the need to prevent dangers posed by carrying
single shot pistols and knives in a largely rural, sparsely populated nation, those dangers pale in comparison to those created by semi-automatic guns in today’s America.
A broad Second Amendment right to guns in public would preclude policy responses that could prevent tragedies. Imagine the
bloodbath that would have resulted if the insurrectionists on January
6, 2021 were constitutionally entitled to carry guns.76 As white supremacist terrorism is a severe ongoing threat to public safety,77 a ruling that prevents authorities from restricting guns in public could lead
to far more deadly uprisings.
Experience tells us what happens when people feel empowered
to carry and use guns when they deem necessary. Consider the men
who claimed to be conducting a citizen’s arrest and acting in self-defense when they killed Ahmaud Arbery while he was jogging in Georgia.78 Or the man who claimed to be securing his neighborhood when
he killed Trayvon Martin in Florida.79 Not to mention the hot-headed

76. Steve Holland, Jeff Mason & Jonathan Landay, Trump Summoned Supporters to
“Wild” Protest, and Told Them to Fight. They Did, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2021),
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-election-protests-idUKKBN29B2CZ
[https://perma.cc/6NJF-XMFB].
77. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM
POSES HEIGHTENED THREAT IN 2021 (2021).
78. Richard Fausset, What We Know About the Shooting Death of Ahmaud Arbery,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/ahmaud-arbery
-shooting-georgia.html [https://perma.cc/GLU3-JVAC].
79. Karen Grigsby Bates, A Look Back at Trayvon Martin’s Death and the Movement
it
Inspired,
NPR
(Jul.
31,
2018),
https://www.npr.org/sections/
codeswitch/2018/07/31/631897758/a-look-back-at-trayvon-martins
-death-and-the-movement-it-inspired [https://perma.cc/D54Y-TLTP].
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dad convinced that his child was robbed of playing time,80 or the
woman aggrieved because she was cut off in traffic.81
Social science confirms that restricting public gun carrying is an
effective measure to prevent injury and death. Guns are used “far
more often to kill and wound innocent victims than to kill and wound
criminals . . . [and] guns are also used far more often to intimidate and
threaten than they are used to thwart crimes.”82 Studies show that
public gun carrying increases the risk of victimization to violent crime,
and does “not protect those who possessed them from being shot in
an assault.”83 An increase in guns in public may cause increased criminal violence.84
Public gun carrying creates danger to police as well. When five
police officers were shot and killed at a protest in Dallas in 2016, many
protestors were carrying firearms, which made it harder for police to
identify and stop the shooter.85 Dallas’s then-police chief said, “[w]e
don’t know who the ‘good guy’ versus who the ‘bad guy’ is, if everybody starts shooting.”86 After a man open-carrying a rifle in Louisiana
shot and killed three officers, the police union president said that open
carry “scares the hell out of me.”87 A survey found 75% of responding
80. Sarah McRitchie, Basketball Coach Held on $500,000 Bond After Sandusky
Tournament Shooting, ABC NEWS (Apr. 17, 2021), https://www.13abc.com/2021/
04/17/suspect-in-custody-after-basketball-tournament-shooting [https://perma.cc/
AAV5-P6MK].
81. NBC Washington Staff, Man Shot by Woman in D.C. Road Rage Attack Dies: Police, NBC WASH. (Apr. 28, 2021), https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/
man-shot-by-woman-in-dc-road-rage-attack-dies-police/2654538
[https://perma
.cc/4D8X-NVVP].
82. David Hemenway & Deborah Azrael, The Relative Frequency of Offensive and
Defensive Gun Uses: Results from a National Survey, 15 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 257, 271
(2000).
83. Charles C. Branas et al., Investigating the Link Between Gun Possession and Gun
Assault, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2034, 2037 (2009); see, e.g., John J. Donohue, The Impact
of Concealed-Carry Laws, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE
(Jens Ludwig & Phillips J. Cook eds., 2003); Jens Ludwig, Concealed-Gun-Carrying Laws
and Violent Crime: Evidence from State Panel Data, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 248
(1998).
84. Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, The Social Costs of Gun Ownership, 90 J. PUB. ECON.
379, 387 (2006).
85. Ernest Scheyder, Dallas Police Chief Says Armed Civilians in Texas ‘Increasingly
Challenging’, REUTERS (Jul. 10, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-policeprotests/dallas-police-chief-says-armed-civilians-in-texas-increasingly-challengingidUSKCN0ZQ0V8 [https://perma.cc/V7SY-BGNS].
86. Id.
87. Maya Lau & Jim Mustian, Baton Rouge Police Shooting Brings Renewed Attention to Louisiana’s ‘Open Carry’ Rights, ADVOCATE (Aug. 6, 2016), https://www
.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/baton_rouge_officer_shooting/
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Texas police chiefs opposed open carry and 90% said that any open
carry should require licenses.88
Racial bias, implicit or explicit,89 makes civilian carry particularly
risky for people of color. For example, in 2018, Emantic Bradford, Jr.,
a Black licensed gun owner, sought to protect himself and others when
a shooting broke out at the mall.90 Responding officers mistook him as
the assailant and shot him to death.91 Eleven days earlier, police shot
and killed Jemel Roberson, a Black security guard, while he subdued a
suspect.92
The police killings of Ma’Khia Bryant, Daunte Wright, Jacob Blake,
Breonna Taylor, Walter Scott, Philando Castile, Michael Brown, Tamir
Rice, Laquan MacDonald, and many more demonstrate how the presence of guns can quickly escalate to lethal violence where police perceive themselves to be in danger. Whatever one believes caused those
deaths, civilians are far less trained than law enforcement to use firearms, de-escalate potentially violent situations, or deal with stressful
situations. And studies show that despite their training, police miss
their target over half the time.93 Armed civilians will likely have worse
results, and when they miss a target, they can easily hit another, unintended person.
article_83d7317a-5b60-11e6-84b4-13cf89c9f22f.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2021).
88. Tom Benning, 75 Percent of Texas Police Chiefs Responding to Survey Oppose
Open Carry, DALLAS NEWS, (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/
politics/2015/02/13/75-percent-of-texas-police-chiefs-responding-to-survey
-oppose-open-carry [https://perma.cc/U2F8-5E7X].
89. See, e.g., Brentin Mock, What New Research Says about Race and Police Shootings, CITY LAB (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/08/police
-officer-shootings-gun-violence-racial-bias-crime-data/595528 [https://perma.cc/
QDB8-2Y79]; German Lopez, There Are Huge Racial Disparities in How US Police Use
Force, VOX (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.vox.com/identities/2016/8/13/
17938186/police-shootings-killings-racism-racial-disparities
(last visited Nov. 1, 2021).
90. CNN Wire, Family Sues Hoover, Alabama, and the Officer Who Killed Emantic
Bradford Jr. at a Mall on Thanksgiving, FOX43 (Nov. 25, 2019),
https://www.fox43.com/article/news/family-sues-hoover-alabama-and-the-officer
-who-killed-emantic-bradford-jr-at-a-mall-on-thanksgiving/521-ab538c75-6807
-41ae-ab91-9ef37e41732d [https://perma.cc/T4ZW-YN9P].
91. Id.
92. Holly Yan, “Hero” Security Guard Killed By Police Was Working Extra Shifts for
His Son’s Christmas, CNN (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/15/us/
chicago-area-security-guard-police-shooting/index.html
[https://perma.cc/AEG2
-448Z].
93. BERNARD D. ROSTKER ET AL., RAND CORP., EVALUATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT FIREARM TRAINING AND FIREARM-DISCHARGE REVIEW PROCESS 14 (2008)
(finding hit rates below 30%); LOS ANGELES POLICE DEP’T, USE OF FORCE YEAR-END REVIEW
29 (2016) (finding a 33.4% hit ratio).
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Evidence compiled by the Violence Policy Center reveals numerous incidents of persons who were entitled by law to carry concealed
firearms and used those guns to needlessly kill or injure.94 The daily
barrage of gun violence continues to add to the list. Modern reality
supports upholding restrictions on public gun carrying.
V. HELLER’S UNSTABLE FOUNDATION
While some suggest that Heller’s historical and legal conclusions
support vastly expanding the Second Amendment to include a right to
carry guns in public, Heller is too unstable a foundation to be so extended. This is not to suggest that Heller must be reversed in order to
hold that the Second Amendment does not protect a right to carry
guns in public. But the Court should not compound Heller’s historical
errors and tortured constructions by expanding on them.
The Court has recognized that some decisions do not provide
sturdy enough support for expansion, even if they remain precedent
under stare decisis.95 For example, Harris v. Quinn confined a prior
opinion to its narrow holding where the Court had relied on “unwarranted” assumptions and “failed to appreciate” the impact of its application to new facts.96 The Court frequently narrows precedent, which
Professor Richard Re described as “the second cousin of a familiar and
firmly entrenched jurisprudential technique: the canon of constitutional avoidance.”97 Judicial modesty is particularly appropriate with
Heller, which is controversial, and based on questionable assumptions
about history and the Second Amendment’s intended meaning—and
its extension would infringe on other rights and traditions.

94. More than 1,360 Non-Self Defense Deaths Involving Concealed Carry Killers
Since 2007, Latest Violence Policy Center Research Shows, VIOLENCE POL’Y CTR. (Mar. 18,
2020),
https://vpc.org/press/more-than-1360-non-self-defense-deaths-involving
-concealed-carry-killers-since-2007-latest-violence-policy-center-research-shows
[https://perma.cc/3S9M-9Q8Q].
95. See Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014).
96. Id. at 636–38.
97. Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
1861, 1865 (2014) (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 154 (2007) (narrowing
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449,
476 (2007) (narrowing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)); Hein v. Freedom from
Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007) (narrowing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968)); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 725
(2007) (narrowing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003)); Herring v. United
States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (narrowing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)); Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1199–1200 (2010) (narrowing Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 471 (1966))).
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A. HELLER’S SHAKY FOUNDATION
Heller, by a single vote, radically altered over two hundred years
of American jurisprudence. From 1791 to 2008, most courts and commentators agreed that the Second Amendment’s first clause (“A wellregulated militia, being necessary for the security of a free State”) defined the scope of the second (“the right of the people to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed”).98 The notion adopted by Heller—that the
Second Amendment restricted laws regulating private gun possession
and use—was, according to former Chief Justice Warren Burger, “one
of the greatest pieces of fraud, I repeat the word fraud, on the American people by special interest groups I have seen in my lifetime.”99
Not only was Heller’s holding radical, its reasoning was sharply
criticized, even by fervent gun rights supporters. Professor Nelson
Lund, a strong supporter of gun rights, affiliated with the Federalist
Society and Heritage Foundation, wrote of Heller:
The Court’s reasoning is at critical points so defective—and so transparently
non-originalist in some respects—that Heller should be seen as an embarrassment for those who joined the majority opinion.100

***
Justice Scalia flunked his own test . . . Justice Scalia’s majority opinion makes
a great show of being committed to the Constitution’s original meaning, but
fails to carry through on that commitment.101

***
Justice Scalia’s Heller opinion itself shows that his use of history and tradition
is little more than a disguised version of the kind of interest balancing that he
purported to condemn.102
98. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (“In the absence of
any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of
less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to
the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second
Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.”); Saul Cornell,
The Second Amendment Goes To Court, ORIGINS (Nov. 7, 2008), https://
origins.osu.edu/article/second-amendment-goes-court
[https://perma.cc/RU6T
-QEW7]; Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right to Bear Arms, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
593 (2006).
99. Joan Biskupic, Guns: A Second (Amendment) Look, WASH. POST (May 10, 1995),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/supcourt/
stories/courtguns051095.htm [https://perma.cc/Y84E-RB7F].
100. Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1345 (2009).
101. Id.
102. Nelson Lund, No Conservative Consensus Yet: Douglas Ginsburg, Brett Kavanaugh, and Diane Sykes on the Second Amendment, 13 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y
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Reagan-appointee Judge Richard Posner wrote:
[Heller] is questionable in both method and result, and it is evidence that the
Supreme Court, in deciding constitutional cases, exercises a freewheeling discretion strongly flavored with ideology.

***
The irony is that the “originalist” method would have yielded the opposite
result.103

Judge Wilkinson, another Reagan-appointee and formerly shortlisted for Supreme Court nominations, wrote that Heller “represents a
failure—the Court’s failure to adhere to a conservative judicial methodology in reaching its decision. In fact, Heller encourages Americans
to do what conservative jurists warned for years they should not do:
bypass the ballot and seek to press their political agenda in the
courts.”104
Historians called the Court’s historical analysis “at best confused,”105 a “conscious fraud,”106 and “an example of judicial activism
that rivals the most controversial decisions in modern Supreme Court
history.” 107 Even a cursory analysis shows why the opinion received
such poor reviews.
B. HELLER’S ANTI-TEXT TEXTUALISM
“The text is the law,” instructed Justice Scalia, “and it is the text
that must be observed.”108 But if Heller “flunked” the originalism test,
it got an F- in textualism.
PRAC. GRPS. 22, 24 (2012).
103. Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 27, 2008),
https://newrepublic.com/article/62124/defense-looseness [https://perma.cc/3KQF
-XVJG].
104. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95
VA. L. REV. 253, 254 (2009); see, e.g., David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment
Has a Preamble: Original Public Meaning and the Political Culture of Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295 (2009); Paul Finkelman, It Really
Was About a Well Regulated Militia, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 267 (2008); William G. Merkel,
The District of Columbia v. Heller and Antonin Scalia’s Perverse Sense of Originalism, 13
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 349 (2009); Richard A. Epstein, A Structural Interpretation of the
Second Amendment: Why Heller Is (Probably) Wrong on Originalist Grounds, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 171 (2008).
105. See Finkelman, supra note 104, at 267.
106. See Merkel, supra note 104, at 349.
107. Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History: “Meet the New
Boss, Same as the Old Boss”, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2009).
108. Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1136 (1997) (quoting Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a
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The Second Amendment is the only amendment that states its
purpose in its text: “A well-regulated militia, being necessary for the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.”109 The Framers could have written it like the
First Amendment (“Congress shall make no law infringing on the right
to keep and bear arms”), or the Fourth Amendment (“The right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed”).110 Textualism
demands recognition that the Framers included the militia clause for
a reason.111
The first half of the amendment conveys its “obvious purpose,” as
the Supreme Court put it in its unanimous Miller v. United States decision in 1939, “to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness” of the “well-regulated militia.”112 For over two centuries
the Second Amendment was “interpreted and applied with [that] end
in view.”113
The pre-Heller reading of the Second Amendment was essentially: “Since a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms for use in the
militia shall not be infringed.” Meaning is found in every word; the
clauses are consistent. The right effectuates the purpose.
Heller, in contrast, interprets the Amendment more like: “Since a
well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to have and use guns, with nothing to do with militias, shall not be infringed.” The first clause is an inconvenience; the
right has little to do with the purpose and may even contravene it.
Linguistic gymnastics were needed to arrive at this odd construction. Justice Scalia labeled the militia clause a “preamble,” and announced that it should be analyzed last, merely “to ensure that our
reading of the operative clause is consistent with the announced purpose.”114 There was no apparent reason why the Court declined to
Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 22 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997)).
109. U.S. CONST. amend II.
110. United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955); see also ANTONIN SCALIA &
BRYAN A. GARDNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 63–66 (2012).
111. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed that any
clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect.”); see also SCALIA & GARDNER,
supra note 110, at 174.
112. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939); see also District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625–27 (2008).
113. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
114. Heller, 554 U.S. at 578.
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read how judges, like other humans, usually do: start at the beginning
of a sentence, then read to the end.
Historian David Konig explains that the Court’s slice-and-dice
reading “dismembers the amendment and does violence not only to
the intent of those who drafted it, but also to the public that read it,
gave it meaning, and ratified it.”115 Konig explains that the militia language supports an “original public meaning” of the Second Amendment to protect militias.116 While Justice Scalia opined that the
Amendment’s first half did not inform the meaning of the second, Konig explains that is not what the Framers, or their public, understood.117 Konig quotes 1790’s Judge John Jay that “[a] preamble cannot
annul enacting clauses; but when it evinces the intention of the legislature and the design of the act, it enables us, in cases of two constructions, to adopt the one most consonant to their intention and design.”118 The construction of the Second Amendment “consonant to
[its] intention and design” was the pre-Heller reading that related
solely to the well-regulated militia the Framers put front and center.
Nor was the Second Amendment an anachronistic way to protect
private gun rights. Madison chose not to follow a New Hampshire proposal that “Congress shall never disarm any Citizen unless such as are
or have been in Actual Rebellion,” or a Pennsylvania minority proposal that protected people’s “right to bear arms for the defense of
themselves and their state, or the United States, or for the purpose of
killing game.”119
The Framers’ use of “keep and bear arms” further emphasizes the
right’s militia scope. A searching examination of government records
from colonial America “conclusively demonstrated that Congress
overwhelmingly used ‘bear arms’ in a military context.”120 Scholar Nathan Kozuskanich examined the use of “bear arms” in early American
writings and Congressional proceedings from 1763 to 1791, and
found that the term was overwhelmingly used in an “explicitly

115. Konig, supra note 104, at 1297.
116. Id. at 1298–317.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1331.
119. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES AND ORIGINS 169
(Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997); THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 623–24 (Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1976).
120. Nathan Kozuskanich, Originalism, History, and the Second Amendment: What
Did Bearing Arms Really Mean to the Founders?, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 413, 414 (2008);
Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to
“Bear Arms”, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (1989).
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collective or military context” without reference to a personal right to
self-defense.121
Justice Scalia engaged in more gymnastics to evade this meaning.
He construed “keep arms” and “bear arms” separately (though that’s
not what the Framers wrote), and proclaimed, “we find no evidence
that [keep and bear arms] bore a military meaning.”122 Even if that
were true in 2008 (it wasn’t), it certainly isn’t now. Scholarship since
Heller and McDonald confirms that “keep and bear Arms” was an idiomatic military phrase in founding-era America.123 Professor Dennis
Baron evaluated 1,300 instances of the use of “bear arms” in context
and found the overwhelming majority “refer to war, soldiering, or
other forms of armed action by a group rather than an individual” and
only seven uses of the term “were either ambiguous or carried no military connotation.”124
The military meaning of “bear arms” persisted. The Supreme
Court of Tennessee noted in 1840, “[t]he words ‘bear arms’ [] have
reference to their military use,” and went on: “A man in the pursuit of
deer, elk, and buffaloes might carry his rifle every day for forty years,
and yet it would never be said that he had borne arms . . . .”125
In the name of “textualism,” Heller rendered the first thirteen
words of the Second Amendment perhaps the most irrelevant in the
Constitution.
C. CONTRA-HISTORY ORIGINALISM
Justice Scalia claimed to employ a “public meaning” “originalist”
methodology, to construe the text as understood by the public at the

121. See Kozuskanich, supra note 120, at 416.
122. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 591 (2008).
123. Saul Cornell, The Original Meaning of Original Understanding: A Neo-Blackstonian Critique, 67 MD. L. REV. 150, 163 (2007); see also Dennis Baron, Corpus Evidence
Illuminates the Meaning of Bear Arms, 46 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 509 (2019); Nathan Kozuskanich, Originalism in a Digital Age: An Inquiry into the Right to Bear Arms, 29 J.
EARLY REPUBLIC 585, 589 (2009).
124. Baron, supra note 123, at 510. The Corpus of Founding Era American English
(COFEA) includes more than 120,000 texts and 154 million words and the Corpus of
Early Modern English (COEME) includes over 40,000 texts and 1.3 billion words. Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA), BYU LAW, https://lcl.byu.edu/
projects/cofea [https://perma.cc/C5M6-QPVV].
125. Dennis Baron, Antonin Scalia Was Wrong About the Meaning of Bear Arms,
WASH. POST. OP. (May 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
antonin-scalia-was-wrong-about-the-meaning-of-bear-arms/2018/05/21/
9243ac66-5d11-11e8-b2b8-08a538d9dbd6_story.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2021) (citing Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 152 (1840)).
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time of the Framers.126 It’s questionable why American gun policy today should be governed by the supposed understanding of the Second
Amendment by, say, a 1791 blacksmith, or even how such an understanding could be determined. Regardless, history confirms the Second Amendment’s “obvious purpose” to protect state militias, not private arms.127
The Framers drafted and ratified the Second Amendment to address the Anti-Federalists’ fears that Congress could destroy the institution of the state militia.128 George Mason, for example, argued that
Congress could use the authority provided in the Constitution’s militia
clause129 to destroy the militia by “rendering them useless—by disarming them . . . Congress may neglect to provide for arming and disciplining the militia; and the state governments cannot do it, for Congress has an exclusive right to arm them.”130
Heller trivializes this history by divining purposes for the right
that are unexpressed in its text or history. Justice Scalia wrote, “The
prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the
only reason Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly
thought it even more important for self-defense and hunting.”131 He
did not explain why the Framers would write a less important purpose
(militias) into the text, but not mention the purposes that the nameless “most” “undoubtedly” found “more important.”132 He then conceded that “the threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason
that the right . . . was codified,” but declared “that can only show that
self-defense had little to do with the right’s codification; it was the central component of the right itself.”133 For good reason there is no citation or support for this series of speculations.

126. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576–77 (“In interpreting this text, we are guided by the
principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words
and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical
meaning.’”) (citing United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)).
127. Heller, 554 U.S. at 661–62 (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178
(1939)).
128. See Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 340 (1990).
129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 15–16.
130. JONATHAN ELLIOTT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 379 (2d ed. 1941).
131. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599.
132. ELLIOT, supra note 130.
133. Id.
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History tells us that self-defense was not the right’s “central component.”134 Historians Saul Cornell and Nathan DeDino explain that in
the eighteenth century, “the right of individual self-defense was wellestablished under common law, but was legally distinct from the constitutional right to bear arms included in the various state constitutions.”135 The Framers only included the right to bear arms in the constitution “in response to their fear that [the] government might disarm
the militia, not restrict the common law right of self-defense.”136 Even
if some Framers may have wished to protect some private gun rights,
as Professor Akhil Reed Amar observed, “to see the [Second] Amendment as primarily concerned with an individual right to hunt, or protect one’s home,” would be “like viewing the heart of the speech and
assembly clauses as the right of persons to meet to play bridge.”137
The drafting history confirms the Second Amendment’s militia focus. James Madison’s first proposal to Congress read: “The right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and
well regulated militia being the best security of a free country: but no
person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to
render military service in person.”138 The conscientious objector exemption was only needed because the “right” concerned mandatory
service that necessitated exemptions. Madison’s draft also treated
“bearing arms” as synonymous with “render[ing] military service.”139
As there was no concern that people would be required to engage
in armed self-defense, there would be no need for exemption if the
Second Amendment concerned private self-defense, any more than
the First Amendment would need to state that the government may
not compel speech. Further, the Framers ultimately rejected the conscientious objector clause because of concerns that the federal government would designate which people were “religiously scrupulous”

134. Id.
135. Cornell & DeDino, supra note 52, at 499; see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *183–86 (William Carey Jones ed., 1916) (outlining
common law self-defense in English law, which holds that a person who is attacked
with force can respond with force but make no allusion to firearms); RICHARD MAXWELL
BROWN, NO DUTY TO RETREAT: VIOLENCE AND VALUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY
(1991) (examining the right of self-defense).
136. Cornell & DeDino, supra note 56, at 499.
137. Akil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1164
(1991).
138. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 660 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 182–183 (N. Cogan ed. 1997)).
139. See id.
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and thereby weaken the militia.140 This may be an example of what
Professor Nelson Lund notes: “At crucial points, [Justice Scalia] simply
issued ipse dixits unsupported by any historical evidence, and at other
points, he misrepresented historical facts.”141
A few more examples of Heller’s historical flaws: to argue that the
Second Amendment was not limited to a military purpose, Heller cites
Joseph Story—who exclusively focused on the militia in his commentary on the Second Amendment;142 St. George Tucker—who viewed
the right to arms in a military context;143 and Blackstone—who “referred to the right of the people ‘to take part in the militia’ to defend
their political liberties and to the right of Parliament (which represented the people) to raise a militia even when the King sought to deny
it that power.”144 Second Amendment historian Saul Cornell summed
up Justice Scalia’s misreading of history as “a lawyer’s version of a magician’s parlor trick.”145
Five votes cannot declare history, or excise constitutional text.
VI. THE RIGHT TO LIVE VERSUS THE RIGHT TO GUNS
Tradition also supports interpreting the Second Amendment to
preserve the first freedom announced in the Declaration of Independence that created America: the right to live.
All constitutional rights give way to strong interests in public
safety—that is, to protect people’s right to live.146 The right to free
speech does not entitle the speaker to engage in “fighting words” because they create too great a risk of a fist fight.147 The right to freely
exercise religion does not entitle snake handlers to endanger

140. See id.
141. Lund, supra note 100, at 1356–67.
142. Heller, 554 U.S. at 608.
143. Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1053 n.6 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Heller, 554
U.S. at 626)).
144. McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 915–16 (2010) (Breyer, J. dissenting)
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
145. Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of
Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 626 (2008); see also Saul Cornell, Meaning and
Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual History Alternative
to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721 (2013).
146. See generally Jonathan Lowy & Kelly Sampson, The Right Not to Be Shot: Public
Safety, Private Guns, and the Constellation of Constitutional Liberties, 14 GEO. L. J. & PUB.
POL’Y 187 (2016).
147. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
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worshippers.148 Miranda rights give way when police are in search of
a gun, because of its risk to public safety.149
Running through America’s founding documents, jurisprudence,
and history is a recognition—sometimes implicit—of the right to live
and the government’s broad authority to protect that right. Those concerns certainly constrain the Second Amendment right to lethal arms.
After all, while the exercise of free speech, assembly, or other rights
has the potential to result in injury to others, no other right directly
implicates the potential to kill another person like the Second Amendment. As one federal district judge noted in upholding New Jersey’s
law restricting the public carrying of firearms:
[T]his Court shall be careful—most careful—to ascertain the reach of the Second Amendment right that the plaintiffs advance. That privilege is unique
among all other constitutional rights to the individual because it permits the
user of a firearm to cause serious personal injury—including the ultimate injury, death—to other individuals, rightly or wrongly. In the protection of oneself and one’s family in the home, it is a right use. In the deliberate or inadvertent use under other circumstances, it may well be a wrong use. A person
wrongly killed cannot be compensated by resurrection.150

This is not hyperbole. The right sought by the NRA and NYSRPA
is not to carry guns as fashion accessories; it is to carry guns in order
to use them in “armed confrontation.” That means, a right to shoot
people when the carrier deems it necessary. But American law and
tradition has long recognized the authority of government to restrict
guns in public spaces to prevent people from being shot.151 A sweeping Second Amendment ruling could infringe on this fundamental
“right inherent in society to ward off crimes against itself by antecedent precautions.”152
VII. DEATH IN FACT
While this Article focuses on whether the Supreme Court should
extend the Second Amendment into public spaces, the Court may also
decide an issue potentially even more impactful: what standard of review is applied to gun laws.
Heller did not decide what standard of review should be applied
in Second Amendment cases, but most courts have gravitated to a two148. State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975).
149. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
150. Piszczatoski v. Filko, 840 F. Supp. 2d 813, 816 (D.N.J. 2012), aff’d sub nom.
Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013).
151. See Lowy & Sampson, supra 146, at 205 n.113.
152. John
Stuart
Mills,
On
Liberty,
http://fountainheadpress.com/
expandingthearc/assets/millliberty.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2AD-SS3K].
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part test and intermediate scrutiny. Courts generally ask if the regulated conduct is within the scope of the Second Amendment, and if it
is, they apply rational basis, intermediate scrutiny or (rarely) strict
scrutiny, depending on the extent the regulation implicates Second
Amendment activity.153 In some cases, however, courts uphold laws
that come with categories of “longstanding” laws identified in Heller
as “presumptively lawful.”154 For the most part, courts applying these
tests have upheld gun laws as constitutional, including most laws restricting carrying of guns in public.155
Strict scrutiny or a similarly restrictive test would prevent governments from adequately protecting the public, and it would cost
lives. Gun regulation must be preemptive—if a dangerous person is
allowed to carry a gun on the street, there is little means to stop him
from unlawfully shooting someone until it is too late. Nor can gun laws
always be narrowly tailored—regardless of how many assault weapons are not used for mass killings, one AR-15 can be used to terrorize
a community and massacre people—and they often are.
Strict scrutiny is also inconsistent with Heller, which noted that
the Second Amendment leaves legislatures with “a variety of tools for
combating” the “problem of handgun violence.”156 McDonald reaffirmed that “reasonable firearms regulation will continue under the
Second Amendment.”157 Heller included a non-exhaustive list of “presumptively lawful” gun laws,158 many of which would likely not survive
strict scrutiny.
A “text, history and tradition” standard, which then-Judge Brett
Kavanaugh has embraced,159 could be equally perilous. While the Second Amendment’s text, history, and tradition support broad gun regulation, a problem arises if this standard is applied using what historian Saul Cornell calls “law office history—a results oriented
methodology in which evidence is selectively gathered and

153. See, e.g., Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2016).
154. Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1073–74 (2018).
155. See, e.g., Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659 (1st Cir. 2018); Peruta v. County of
San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir.
2013); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 426 (3d Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. County of
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d. Cir. 2012); Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044 (2018). But
see Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Moore v. Madigan, 702
F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
156. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).
157. McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 785 (2010).
158. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 n.26 (emphasis added).
159. Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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interpreted to produce a preordained conclusion.”160 After all, thenJudge Kavanaugh’s dissent applied his “text, history and tradition”
test161 to find that the Second Amendment—which was intended to
protect the use of muskets in well-regulated armies—entitled civilians unrelated to any militia to semi-automatic assault weapons. Judge
Kavanaugh found no precedent for an assault weapon ban in the early
nineteenth century, but that was only because “assault weapons” did
not exist; tellingly, states did ban pistols and other weapons considered especially dangerous at that time. Such laws accord with
longstanding police power authority to protect public safety.
VIII. GUN POLICY AS A DEMOCRACY ISSUE
It bears reminding that the fundamental issue the Supreme Court
will consider is not, what gun laws we should have in America but, who
will decide what gun laws Americans should have. If Americans decide
that their communities would be safer if military style assault weapons were restricted to military, or that guns should be kept out of public spaces, then can Americans enact the public safety laws they want?
Throughout American history, democratic processes have
determined gun policy. Deciding what gun laws to enact is often a
complicated, drawn-out business, involving fierce debate between
interest groups with sharply divergent views. Even legislation that
84% of Americans support, like universal Brady background checks
for gun sales, has failed to pass in Congress.162 A ruling that laws could
only be permissible if they survive “fatal in fact” strict scrutiny, or if
they have clear historical antecedents, would have little to do with
how Americans have historically decided public safety problems,
which is: What makes us safer? Do the safety benefits outweigh the
infringements on liberty, convenience, or cost?
An analogy reflects how bizarre this system would be. Imagine if
gun laws could not be enforced in America, even after prevailing in
multi-decade, drag-out political fights, unless they received the
Historical Tribunal Seal of Approval (to save space, HTSA). Even if a
gun law is widely popular, and experts agree that many Americans
would die if the law was not implemented, the law would be
160. Cornell, supra note 107, at 1098.
161. Heller, 670 F.3d at 1276 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“I read Heller and McDonald as setting forth a test based wholly on text, history, and tradition.”).
162. Eli Yokley, Voters Are Nearly United in Support for Expanded Background
Checks,
MORNING
CONSULTS
(Mar.
10,
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https://
morningconsult.com/2021/03/10/house-gun-legislation-background-checks-polling
[https://perma.cc/GG3Q-7766].
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invalidated unless the HTSA finds it sufficiently similar to some
previous law that has been enacted at some other time in history. The
HTSA will not consider whether the challenged law might not have a
historical analogue because the problem it seeks to address was not
of serious concern in the past, or that the law only failed to be enacted
earlier because of gun industry lobbying clout.
If the HTSA sounds absurd, it is. Historical precedent does not
constrain responses to any other public health or safety issue. And it
is not readily apparent why Americans should be prevented from
addressing a 21st century gun epidemic if earlier generations did not
enact similar laws. Whether the lack of similar laws was because
muskets were not conducive to mass shootings, crime in rural
America was very different, or politicians were unresponsive to the
problem, why should that determine what laws can save Americans
today from being killed?
Of course, gun rights advocates have been largely happy with
democratic solutions when Congress, and many states have enacted
permissive laws favored only by a small minority of gun enthusiasts
and the gun industry and failed to enact strong gun laws supported by
majorities of Americans. But now times are a-changing. A sweeping
Second Amendment decision could effectively freeze United States
gun policy, just when legislative help is on the way for Americans suffering from a deadly epidemic. Depriving Americans of their voice to
decide gun policy could resign them to a death sentence.
CONCLUSION
The coin is in the air, and it will be decided, in the end, by counting
to five on the Supreme Court. There is reason for concern. But there is
also reason to question whether the Court will take such a radical step
as defying America’s history and tradition of gun regulation—especially now, when Americans are demanding solutions to our gun violence epidemic in record numbers. The Justices, like all Americans,
must recognize that everything is at stake when gun policy is at issue.

